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BOOK REVIEWS
Court, and someone who was successful in achieving it. What
Schwartz ends up describing, however, is a weak, ineffectual Chief
Justice, unable to give effect to his own ideological views and, for
the most part, unable to ride herd on his Court. As a result, the
sharp turn to the right from Warren Era liberalism, which both
President Nixon and Burger himself envisioned, never materialized.
In many areas the Burger Court kept Warren policies alive through
sheer inertia, while in others the Court actually moved further to
the left. The turns to the right were haphazard, unpredictable, and
reflected no consistent ideology. This was not an ascent of pragma-
tism; it was a collapse of leadership. "I don't think that the Burger
Court has as wide a sense of mission," Schwartz quotes then Asso-
ciate Justice Rehnquist as saying, in comparing the Burger and
Warren Courts. "Perhaps it doesn't have any sense of mission at
all." Schwartz concludes that Roe v. Wade was the "paradigmatic"
Burger Court decision-because it reveals a thrashing group, with
even those in agreement as to outcome unable to form a consensus
on the reasoning.
CONSTITUTION MAKING: CONFLICT AND CONSEN-
SUS IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787. By
Calvin C. Jillson., New York: Agathon Press. 1988. Pp. xiv,
242. Hardcover, $30.00; Paperback, $15.00.
Richard S. Kay2
In this book Professor Calvin Jillson, a political scientist, has
sought to cast new light on the much-studied process of decision-
making at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. It is an interesting
attempt to apply modem techniques of quantitative social science
'research to the archival evidence of the Convention's proceedings.
While this is an admirable and promising enterprise, in the end the
illumination shed by the data examined proves disappointingly
limited.
In one sense, Professor Jillson is attempting to complicate what
he takes to be oversimplified explanations in the existing literature.
He reads previous analysts as falling into two categories, each con-
centrating on a limited and partial approach to the Convention.
One group (Charles Beard and Forrest McDonald are exemplary)
1. Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado,
Boulder.
2. Professor of Law, University of Connecticut.
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saw the differences in Philadelphia largely as a clash of material-
social and economic-interests. Another, somewhat later, group
(here Louis Hartz and Bernard Bailyn are typical) were more im-
pressed with the convention's divisions on ideological and theoreti-
cal lines. Jillson, on the other hand, posits an understanding of the
deliberations in which both interest- and principle-based differences
were important.
In a second sense, however, Professor Jillson seeks to simplify
and organize our views of the convention. "[T]he activities of the
Convention," he tells us, "were by no means as fluid and unstruc-
tured as past interpretations have indicated." Conflicts based on
principle and those based on interests more or less took turns in
controlling the course of decision.
More specifically, Jillson divides the four and one-half months
of the convention into five discrete periods. In two of these periods
the issues were dominated by "higher level questions." These ques-
tions were concerned in a general way with "the scope, scale and
form appropriate to government." In deciding such issues, Jillson
claims, the state delegations divided into two coalitions reflecting
the political subcultures of different regions of the country. There
was first what he calls a "peripheral coalition" of the states of New
England and the South. In each of these regions either "moralistic"
or "libertarian" republican attitudes resulted in a preference for
limited and localized governmental power. Against this alliance, he
finds, ranged a second coalition of Middle Atlantic states where
"nationalist" republicanism manifested itself in a preference for
stronger and more dynamic government.
In the remaining three periods, on the other hand, Professor
Jillson asserts that these alignments, premised on large principles of
government, gave way to voting patterns reflecting more concrete
interests. The groupings of states described were somewhat differ-
ent in each period and depended on the questions under discussion.
To begin with, there is some doubt whether Jillson is correct in
maintaining that prior treatments have consistently emphasized ide-
ology at the expense of interest or vice versa. Christopher and
James Collier, in their enlightening and highly readable recent ac-
count of the Convention, explicitly acknowledge the importance of
both kinds of influence.3 And Forrest McDonald, whose earlier
work is cited by Jillson as an example of the interest-based, eco-
nomic interpretation of the convention, felt it necessary to complete
his analysis with a volume focusing on the "intellectual
3. Christopher Collier and James Lincoln Collier, Decision in Philadelphia: The Con-
stitutional Convention of 1787 xi-xii (Random House, 1986) ("Decision in Philadelphia").
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dimension."4
It is apparent, in any event, that the sharp distinction drawn
between these two classes of issues is, at best, problematic. Jillson
defines "higher level" issues as those relating to "regime type and
:. . the basic options for institutional design." The "lower level"
issues are those concerning the "rules that will regulate and order
behavior within the regime's primary institutions." The former
questions were decided based on broad political philosophies-
largely because the participants were less able to forecast on which
side of the controversy their more immediate interests lay.
Such a distinction makes intuitive sense but appears to break
down as soon as an attempt is made to relate it to the particular
questions at issue in the convention. Thus we can understand that
the apportionment of representatives in the national legislature
might be thought directly to engage material interests. Therefore, it
would likely have been fought out on the "lower level." But then
why wasn't the method of selection of the executive, which Jillson
finds was contested on the "higher level," the same kind of issue?
A dramatic example of the problems of classification is the is-
sue of slavery. Jillson places it on the "lower level."5 Certainly the
character of any national regulation of slavery and the slave trade
had profound economic consequences for certain states and was,
moreover, closely related to questions of representation and there-
fore of relative political power. But it does not take too much re-
flection to realize that its resolution was fundamentally related to
larger questions of the kind of polity the delegates were framing. It
could not but be influenced by convictions of deep principle. There
is ample evidence that many delegates were conscious of that
dimension.6
The centerpiece of Professor Jillson's picture of the convention
is a statistical analysis of the 569 roll call votes. The technique em-
ployed is known as "factor analysis." Unfortunately for the uniniti-
ated, Jillson provides almost nothing in the way of explaining the
rationale or methodology of this device. The statistically innocent
reader is confronted with table after terrifying table of rows and
4. Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitu-
tion viii-ix (U. Press Kansas, 1985) (Novus Ordo Seclorum").
5. At a different point, however, Jillson speaks of the slavery controversy as illustrative
of a "more general conflict between an expansive Americanism and a restricted regionalism."
This formulation is more consistent with the definition of "higher level" issues.
6. See e.g., McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum at 50-55 (cited in note 4). But see Max
Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States 110 (Yale U. Press, 1913)
("Framing") ("[S]lavery was not the important question, it might be said it was not the moral
question, that it later became.... As a matter of fact, there was comparatively little said on
the subject in the convention.")
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columns of numbers with such daunting headings as "Large States
versus Small States: Power and Interest: Five Factor Solution to
Roll-Call Votes 37-156, June 11 - July 17, Varimax Rotation
(Ortho)."
Factor analysis is, I have learned elsewhere,7 a way of trying to
make sense of a great mass of data. Correlations of individual ele-
ments are discovered and those correlations are further examined to
see whether they can be accounted for by some smaller number of
common factors. In Jillson's analysis of the roll call votes at the
convention, for example, correlations of votes between pairs of indi-
vidual states are examined to determine whether these individual
associations cluster together in a way that indicates the presence of
some common explanatory factors. It is in this way that Jillson has
teased out of the data stable patterns of voting by coalition over
particular periods, as well as the moments when these coalitions
dissolved and formed again. The work done to execute this project
is impressive. At least as far as I am able to judge, the methods
employed seem sensible and the results statistically significant.
In addition to this statistical demonstration, Jillson provides a
textual discussion of the formation and shifts in the coalitions he
has discovered. Going over the same periods which have emerged
from the factor analysis, he examines these coalitions in action, not-
ing the issues that dominated debate in each period and the underly-
ing reasons that might explain the particular alignments associated
with them. It is in this connection that he posits the distinction
between higher and lower level issues mentioned.
There are obvious limits to the understanding which can be
taken from an analysis that focuses on the divisions at the conven-
tion. That is because, to a very remarkable degree, certain critical
convictions were held almost universally. For example, Professor
Jillson observes that by May 30 the distinct nationalist and localist
perspectives on the shape of the new government had already devel-
oped. But, in fact, on May 31 the Convention approved a resolu-
tion giving the national legislature the power to legislate "in all
cases to which the State Legislatures were individually incompe-
tent" by a vote of 9-0-1. Nor did the division of opinion he observes
appear on July 17 when Roger Sherman's motion to confine this
power so as not to extend to "any matters of internal police which
respect the government of such states only" was defeated by a vote
7. See Frederick Williams, Reasoning with Statistics How to Read Quantitative Re-
search 165-83 (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 3d ed. 1986). Noreen Channels of the Sociology
Department of Trinity College was kind enough to explain it to me. She should not be
blamed for my, no doubt, imperfect understanding.
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of 8-2.8
Even when the convention was plainly of more than one mind,
the structure emerging from the factor analysis is often discernible
only with great difficulty in the heuristic description that accompa-
nies it. Jillson quite properly focuses his textual discussion on the
significant votes on the central issues confronting the convention.
When he does this, however, the arrangement of votes often does
not fall obviously into the pattern to be expected from the statistical
study. Indeed, on occasion one gets the sense that the delegations'
positions on related votes on the same issue were almost random.
An example is a series of votes taken on July 17 and 19 on the
term and selection of the executive. According to Jillson, this pe-
riod and this question were dominated by "higher level" considera-
tions and, therefore, the votes can be best explained in light of the
two voting coalitions mentioned. The first, "peripheral," coalition
consisted, at that moment, of four states: Massachusetts, North
Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia. It favored a "dependent ex-
ecutive package" based on selection by the national legislature, a
relatively long term and ineligibility for reelection. The opposing
"Middle Atlantic" coalition consisted of six states: Connecticut,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia.9
This coalition favored an "independent executive package" based
on election by popular vote or an electoral college, a relatively short
term and the possibility of reelection.
Now consider the actual voting on the eleven roll call votes on
questions involving these issues on these two days. It is unnecessary
to recount the actual issues involved in each vote. They all concern
the interrelated issues of term, selection and reelectabilitylo and we
should therefore expect to see the two coalitions listed above. The
lists below group the delegations by how they voted (aye, no, di-
vided) on each roll call:
8. Max Farrand, ed., 2 Records of the Federal Convention 25-26 (Yale U. Press, 1911)
("Records").
9. Neither New Hampshire nor New York had delegations present on these days.
10. These votes are taken from Farrand, 2 Records, as Jillson does not give a complete
breakdown of each vote. Votes 1-6 were taken on July 17, and are found in id. at 24. Votes
7-11 were taken on July 19 and are found in id. at 51. The subject matter of each vote was as
follows. 1. To choose executive by popular election. 2. To choose executive by electors. 3.
To choose executive by national legislature. 4. To strike ineligibility for second term. 5. To
substitute "good behavior" for seven year term. 6. To strike seven year term. 7. To choose
executive by electors. 8. To choose electors by state legislatures. 9. To make executive ineli-
gible for second term. 10. To set seven year term. (In Madison's notes, Connecticut is shown
voting aye and New Jersey no. Id. at 58.) 11. To set six year term.
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It is difficult to see how these votes exemplify a stable pattern of
coalition voting. While this example may be extreme, it illustrates a
common and unsatisying lack of fit between the general thesis,
founded on the statistical study, and the textual explanation of par-
ticular debates and votes. Necessarily it makes the reader skeptical
of the former.
A critical difficulty may be the assumption-at the heart of this
analysis-that the proceedings of the Convention can be best under-
stood as the decisions of state delegations. The almost anthropo-
morphic emphasis on states ("During the first week of September
... Connecticut, New Jersey, and Maryland struggled to maintain
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the integrity of the states in the new system.") casts an air of unreal-
ity on the description.
It is true that votes were taken by states. Indeed, the Conven-
tion rejected a rule allowing the recording of individual votes."1
Consequently, state votes provide the only available data for this
kind of study. Moreover, the delegates certainly consulted the in-
terests of their states when casting their votes. But an exclusive
focus on the states as the critical units obscures the role of the indi-
vidual delegates, the real actors in the drafting process. This is
made obvious by the numerous instances in which a state delegation
was unable to vote because its members were divided. What could
it mean, for example, to refer to the position of "New York" at the
convention? Two of its three delegates, Robert Yates and John
Lansing, opposed the creation of a strong national government and
(until they left the Convention in mid-July, leaving the state with no
vote) controlled the votes of the delegation over the opposition of
their colleague, Alexander Hamilton.12 Hamilton's impact on the
convention has never been thought to be substantial,13 but Jillson's
analysis leaves him out altogether. Similarly, the differences be-
tween George Mason and James Madison on such matters as a na-
tional veto of state legislation or a bill of rights are submerged in the
actions of a single vote of Virginia.14
In the end, Constitution Making contains a great deal of useful
information and more than a few interesting insights. It is hard to
resist the conclusion, however, that its depiction of the convention
is too much the captive of the numbers that form its foundation. As
such it is more valuable for its description than its explanation.
11. Farrand, 1 Records at 10.
12. See Farrand, Framing at 29, 73, 81, 105 (cited in note 6); Collier and Collier, Deci-
sion in Philadelphia at 56-57 (cited in note 3).
13. See Collier and Collier, Decision in Philadelphia at 56 (cited in note 3).
14. See id. at 197-98, 254.
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